Política Externa Brasileira

Here is President Barack Obama’s letter to Lula:

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
April 20, 2010

His Excellency
Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva
President of the Federative Republic of Brazil
Brasilia
Dear Mr. President:

I want to thank you for our meeting with Turkish PrinIe Miuister Erdogan during the Nuclear Security Summit. We spent some time focused on Iran, the issue ofthe provision of nuclear fuel for the Tehran Research Reactor (TRR), and the intent of Brazil and Turkey to work toward finding an acceptable solution. I promised to respond in detail to your ideas. I have carefully considered our discussion, and I would like to offer a detailed explanation of my perspective and suggest a way ahead.

I agree with you that the TRR is an opportunity to pave the way for a broader dialogue in dealing with the more fundamental concerns of the intemational community regarding Iran’s overall nuclear program From the beginning, I have viewed Iran’ s request as a clear and tangible opportunity to begin to build mutual trust and confidence, and thereby create time and space for a constructive diplomatic processo That is why the Uuited States so strongly supported
the proposal put forth by former International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Director General EIBaradei.

The IAEA’s proposal was crafted to be fair and balanced, and for both sides to gain trust and confidence. For us, Iran’s agreement to transfer 1,200 kg of Iran’s low enriched uranium (LEU) out of the country would build confidence and reduce regional tensions by substantially reducing Iran’s LEU stockpile. I want to underscore that this element is of fundamental importance for the United States. For Iran, it would receive the nuclear fuel requested to ensure continued operation ofthe TRR to produce needed medical isotopes and, by using its own material, Iran would begin to demonstrate peaceful nuclear intent. Not withstanding Iran’s continuing defiance oftive United Nations Security Council resolutions mandating that it cease its enrichment of uranium, we were prepared to support and facilitate action on a proposal that would provide Iran nuclear fuel using urauium enriched by Iran — a demonstration of our willingness to be creative in pursuing a way to build mutual confidence.

During the course of the consultations, we also recognized Iran’s desire for assurances. As a result, my team focused on ensuring that the lAEA’s proposal contained several built-in measures, including a U.S. national declaration of support, to send a clear signal from my government of our willingness to become a direct signatory and potentially even play a more
direct role in the fuel production process, a central role for Russia, and the IAEA’s assumption of full custody of the nuclear material throughout the fuel production process. In effect, the IAEA’s proposal offered Iran significant and substantial assurances and commitrnents from the IAEA, the United States, and Russia. Dr. EI Baradei stated publicly last year that the United States wouId be assuming the vast majority ofthe risk in the IAEA’s proposal.

As we discussed, Iran appears to be pursuing a strategy that is designed to create the impression of flexibility without agreeing to actions that can begin to build mutual trust and confidence. We have observed Iran convey hints of flexibility to you and others, but formally reiterate an unacceptable position through official channels to the IAEA. Iran has continued to reject the IAEA’s proposal and insist that Iran retain its low-enriched uranium on its territory until delivery of nuclear fuel. This is the position that Iran formally conveyed to the IABA in Jantiary 2010 and again in February.

We understand from you, Turkey and others that Iran continues to propose that Iran wouId retain its LEU on its territory until there is a simultaneous exchange of its LEU for nuclear fuel. As General Jones noted during our meeting, it will require one year for any amount of nuclear fuel to be produced. Thus, the confidence-building strength ofthe IAEA’s proposal would be completely eliminated for the United States and several risks would emerge. First, Iran would be able to continue to stockpile LEU throughout this time, which wouId enable them to acquire an LEU stockpile equivalent to the amount needed for two or three nuclear weapons in a year’ s time. Second, there would be no guarantee that Iran would uItimately agree to the final exchange. Third, IAEA "custody" oflran’s LEU inside ofIran would provide us no measurable improvement over the current situation, and the IAEA cannot prevent Iran from re-assuming control of its uranium at any time.

There is a potentially important compromise that has already been offered. Last November, the IAEA conveyed to Iran our offer to allow Iran to ship its 1,200 kg ofLEU to a third country — specifically Turkey·- at the outset ofthe process·to be held "in escrow" as a guarantee during the fuel production process that Iran would get back its uranium ifwe failed to
deliver the fuel. Iran has never pursued the "escrow" compromise and has provided no credible explanation for its rejection. I believe that this raises real questions about Iran’s nuclear intentions, if Iran is unwilling to accept an offer to demonstrate that its LEU is for peaceful, civilian purposes. I wouId urge Brazil to impress upon Iran the opportunity presented by this offer to "escrow" its uranium in Turkey while the nuclear fuel is being produced.

Throughout this process, instead of building confidence Iran has undermined confidence in the way it has approached this opportunity. That is why I question whether Iran is prepared to engage Brazil in good faith, and why I cautioned you during our meeting. To begin a constructive diplomatic process, Iran has to convey to the IAEA a constructive commitrnent to engagement through official charmels — something it has failed to do. Meanwhile, we will pursue sanctions on the timeline that I have outlined. I have also made clear that I will leave thedoor open to engagement with Iran. As you know, Iran has thus far failed to accept my offer of comprehensive and unconditional dialogue.

I look forward to the next opportunity to see you and discuss these issues as we consider the challenge of Iran’s nuclear program to the security ofthe international community, including in the U.N. Security Council.

Artigos Relacionados:

• 15 de março de 2009 -- EUA e Brasil: ensaios "futurológicos" (atualizado com a análise de Virgílio Arraes) (0)
  Por Daniel Cardoso Tavares Abaixo seguem algumas idéias levantadas por professores sobre os rumos do relacionamento Brasil-EUA.   Cristina Pecequilo – título da notícia: Analista admite momento inédito na relação Brasil-EUA (resumo) -  Temos que ser realistas. Continuará o clima positivo de aprofundamento de diálogo entre os países, mas não haverá grandes movimentos para destravar a Rodada Doha, ou reformar abertamente o CSNU. Vivemos hoje, porém, um momento inédito. "O B...
• 27 de janeiro de 2009 -- Em telefonema a Lula, Hussein Obama defende Doha e coordenação para G20 (0)
    O presidente dos EUA instruiu sua equipe econômica a "aproximar posições com o Brasil" para a reunião do G20 (abril). Obama convidou Lula para visitá-lo em março, quando este lá estará para um seminário de investidores. Existe a expectativa de que Hussein aceite o convite de Lula e venha ao Brasil ainda este ano. [ad] Lula disse a ele que a imagem norte-americana durante seu governo será fortalecida na América Latina. Os dois presidentes discutiram os pontos da agenda nos qua...
• 17 de dezembro de 2008 -- XXXVI Reunião do CMC – Comunicado Conjunto (Resumo) (0)
  Os Presidentes da Argentina, Brasil, Paraguai, Uruguai e Venezuela, reuniram-se, juntamente com os Estados Associados (Chile, Equador, Colômbia, Bolívia e Peru) e convidados (Cuba, Guiana, México, Panamá e Suriname), em Salvador, no dia 16 de dezembro de 2008. O desenvolvimento social foi o tema central dessa primeira sesão ampliada do CMC (Conselho do Mercado Comum). Lá debateram alternativas para enfrentar a crise mundial e evitar que seus efeitos cheguem até a região de forma a comprometer o...
• 29 de junho de 2010 -- Crítica: À Sombra de de Gaulle – A Política Externa do Governo Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva (2003-2010) (1)
  Fonte: Revista Novos Estudos do CEBRAP (possivelmente, já que ainda não foi publicado) Nota: Grifos e comentários por Daniel Cardoso Tavares À sombra de de Gaulle: uma diplomacia carismática e intransferível A política externa do governo Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva (2003-2010)   Atribuído a Rubens Ricupero maio de 2010               O modelo ao qual mais se assemelha a diplomacia de ...
• 28 de junho de 2010 -- Um Brasil no Oriente? (1)
  Fonte: carta Capital ALÉM DA PARCERIA na tentativa de negociar um acordo do Irã com o Ocidente, há muitas semelhanças entre os momentos históricos vividos pelo Brasil e pela Turquia. Com cerca de 40% da população e do PIB e 67% das exportações do Brasil (mas volume maior de importações) o país do primeiro-ministro Recep Tayyip Erdogan pesa menos na economia global, mas sua importância geopolitica é comparável, pois está numa das encruzilhadas estratégicas mais importantes do planeta e possui...

67 Responses to “Obama’s Letter to Lula Regarding Brazil-Iran-Turkey Nuclear Negotiations”

Leave a Reply

Clique aqui para cancelar a resposta.

Name (required)

Mail (will not be published) (required)

Website

Before you submit form:

Human test by Not Captcha

Avise-me por e-mail quando houver novos comentários.