Política Externa Brasileira

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S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 05 BRASILIA 001383

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NSC FOR RACHEL WALSH, LUIS ROSELLO

DOE FOR GARY WARD, RUSS ROTH

COMMERCE FOR ITA/MAC/ANNE DRISCOLL, LORRIE FUSSELL DEPT FOR WHA/FO, WHA/EPSC, WHA/BSC

DEPT ALSO FOR EEB MATT MCMANUS, BRIAN DUGGAN DEPT PASS DHS AND USTDA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 011/2/2019

TAGS: ENRG ECON KSEC ECIP EINV PREL BR

SUBJECT: BRAZIL: BLACKOUT -CAUSES AND IMPLICATIONS

Classified By: Charge d’Affaires Cherie Jackson, Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). REFTELS: A) 2008 BRASILIA 672, B) 2008 BRASILIA 593, C)2008 SAO PAULO 260

¶1. (S)SUMMARY: On November 10 at 22:13, Brazil experienced a blackout that plunged 18 of Brazil’s 27 states into darkness for periods ranging from 20 minutes to 6 hours. A government commission is investigating, with a draft report and recommendations expected mid-December. GOB has recently begun to focus more attention on infrastructure security, both within the President’s office and at Mines and Energy (MME), while an intensive process is also underway to develop recommendations to avoid outage problems in the future. The newly heightened concerns about Brazil’s infrastructure as a result of this blackout, combined with the need to address infrastructure challenges in the run-up to the 2014 World Cup and 2016 Olympics, present the United States opportunities for engagement on infrastructure development as well critical infrastructure protection and possibly cyber security. Mission encourages USG agencies, including DOD, DHS, FCC, TDA and others, to explore these opportunities in the near-term. END SUMMARY

THE EVENT

¶2. (U) On November 10 at 22:13, Brazil experienced a blackout that plunged 18 of Brazil’s 27 states into darkness for periods ranging from 20 minutes to 6 hours. The blackout represented a loss of 28,000 megawatts – or 45 percent of total Brazilian consumption at that instant – of electricity and left an estimated 87 million residents without power. Scrutiny has been intense and speculation rife over the cause of the incident, in large part due to the recent announcement of Rio as the host of the 2016 summer Olympics.

WHAT HAS THE GOVERNMENT DETERMINED SO FAR?

¶3. (C) On November 18, Econoff met with Plinio de Oliveira, the President of ONS, the governmental agency responsible for the nation’s interlinked electricity grid, along with Wilkens Geraldes Filho, ONS’s Director of Statistical Analysis, and Elione Vierira de Araujo, a top engineer. They had spent much of the past week researching the incident and presenting explanations as to what happened. Geraldes and Olivera joined the conversation late after an impromptu meeting with the Director General of ONS to discuss the incident. The team gave Econoff the same presentation they gave after the incident to Energy Minister Lobao. On November 20, Econoff met separately with Jose Coimbra, Chief of Staff to Minister of Mines and Energy Edison Lobao, and Ildo Wilson Grudtner, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Electrical Energy, who was the Ministry official called in to work the issue the night of November the 10th and with overall responsibility for electrical sector planning.

¶4. (C) Based on those detailed discussions, the following is what the government now says occurred. The source of the outage was a substation close to Sao Paulo called Itaburi on the Tijuco Preto powerline, which supplies Sao Paulo and then Rio with power from the Itaipu dam (a binational hydroelectric dam on the border with Paraguay responsible for 12,600MW of energy or 20 percent of Brazil’s energy supply. Brazil’s energy matrix is heavily hydro dependent – 80 percent – with the rest a combination of thermo, nuclear, and some bioelectricity.). At that point in the system there are three separate power lines that connect Itaipu into Sao Paulo carrying 765 kilovolts of 60HZ AC supply. There is a separate supply line from Itaipu into Sao Paulo north of the Tijuco Preto power line, which carries 50 Hz of DC power. The Sao Paulo/Rio region is also linked by separate lines to the southern part of the country, as well as to the north and north east, which are also interlinked with one another. Overall system consumption for the day was 60 GW, well below total system capacity of 105 GW.

¶5. (C) At 22:13, there was a short circuit in one of the three Itaburi lines in what they call the "B" cycle. 13.5 milliseconds later, cycle "A" experienced a short circuit in the second line. 3.2 milliseconds after that, the substation at Itaber went out, knocking out the third and final line, completely disrupting the flow of the southern supply line from Itaipu into Sao Paulo. When this happened, automated controls took over to preserve the system. The generators at Itaipu shut down when they detected the disruption in BRASILIA 00001383 002 OF 005 transmission, thereby also shutting down the northern supply line to Sao Paulo. The interlinked systems in the northeast and northern regions of the country, detecting oscillation in the supply coming from Sao Paulo, shut off the transmission lines to protect those regions. In the southern region of the country, which was also providing energy supply to Sao Paulo, the sudden changes in frequency triggered ERAC (an emergency system in each substation monitoring balance between the supply and the load) isolating the southern section from the rest of the grid. These changes preserved the rest of the system and permitted a quick return to service for most of the country, but left the major population centers without power for up to six hours.

WHAT FACTORS EXACERABATED THE EVENT?

¶6. (C) Geraldes described the events of November 10 as unusual, not in the interruption of the system, but in the confluence of events that led to the overall catastrophic scale of the blackout. He said that a similar disruption taking out the same line had occurred in the past but the system had been operating in such a way that the flow was redistributed with very little disruption. In the November 10 case, reservoirs were full due to recent abundant rainfalls and the thermal plants, which are often tapped to augment flow, were not operating. The interlinked system which allows electricity from any part of the country to be distributed to any other part was exporting power from the primary hydroplants in the South to the Sao Paulo/Rio region. According to Geraldes, in prior instances, the situation was reversed, with flow exported from Sao Paulo to the south during periods of less plentiful rainfall and the disruption had very little effect on the overall supply.

¶7. (C) Grudtner said international standards generally call for a system to have capacity allowing unimpeded operation with one transmission line inoperable. At the time of the incident, the Brazilian system was operating at a capacity of unimpeded operations with two lines down, but the incident took out all three lines feeding into Sao Paulo. Additionally Coimbra pointed out, each of the lines which were disabled have recovery times of ten seconds, but the short circuits occurred within milliseconds of one another, disabling the transmission system with automatic shutdowns before the lines were able to recover. Geraldes called it the worst possible configuration of factors that led to a cascade effect.

WHAT IS THE GOVERNMENT DOING TO INVESTIGATE FURTHER?

¶8. (C) A government commission composed of ONS and the Brazilian electricity regulator ANEEL is investigating exactly what happened on November 10. The commission has 30 days from its formation on November 13 to complete a draft of its findings, including possible recommendations. The government will then submit the draft report to an independent group of non-governmental experts and academicians for review. The government will finalize the report after that review. In the absence of the final report, neither ONS nor MME offered a definitive explanation for what caused these outages. However, they both maintained that the short circuits are consistent with either a lightning strike (although ONS took pains to show satellite photos demonstrating that there were not storms in that area at that particular time) or a combination of low barometric pressure combined with high winds and high humidity. ONS also showed photos of transmission towers with visible discoloration, which they say further supports these two theories and rules out damage from trees, physical sabotage, or hackers. (Note: there was no way for Econoff to verify the location of the towers in the photos, the times of the discoloration, nor the cause. End Note.)

¶9. (C) Oliveira and Geraldes further ruled out the possibility of hackers because, following some acknowledged interferences in past years, GOB has closed the system to only a small group of authorized operators, separated the transmission control system from other systems, and installed filters. Coimbra confirmed that the ONS system is a CLAN network using its own wires carried above the electricity wires. Oliveira pointed out that even if someone had managed to gain access to the system, a voice command is required to disrupt transmission. Coimbra said that while sabotage could have caused the outages, this type of disruption would have been deadly, and investigators would have found physical evidence, including the body of the perpetrator. He also noted that any internal attempts by system employees to disrupt the system would have been easily BRASILIA 00001383 003 OF 005 traceable, a fact known to anyone with access to the system.

THEORIES FROM THE PRIVATE SECTOR, PRESS, AND OTHER AGENCIES

¶10. (U) In the days immediately following the event, government officials were quoted giving explanations ranging from a downed powerline hit by a tree, storm damage, to the more general and on-message short circuit. Meteorologists and energy analysts questioned the government’s weather explanations. Brazil’s National Institute of Space Research (INPE), which monitors atmospheric activity, stated they recorded no lightning strikes on the day of the blackout in the immediate vicinity of the transmission lines in question. Adriano Pires, founding director of the Brazilian Center for Infrastructure and a highly-regarded Rio-based energy expert, ruled out the government’s explanations, instead blaming an outdated national grid unable to keep pace with demand. In order to avoid future widespread outages, Pires told Rio Econoff, the Brazilian government needs to diversify its sources away from Itaipu by increasing thermoelectric generation and focusing less on just operating costs. Press reports have also suggested that, in order to handle the 2014 World Cup and 2016 Olympic Games, the GoB needs to upgrade its transmission lines and build smaller-scale power plants – independent of the national grid – closer to high energy consumption centers, such as Rio de Janeiro and Sao Paulo.

¶11. (C) In the meeting with Brasilia econoff, ONS officials uniformly rejected the claims of an outdated grid, noting that the current grid was brought up to date after the 2001 blackouts, and now meets and exceeds international performance criteria and serves some 98% of the country. Coimbra laughed at the suggestion that more construction of thermo plants is the solution, not only because there are existing thermo plants which are not being utilized due to high generation costs, but because even had they been in use, the thermo plants would need 12-13 hours to power up after a power failure. Itaipu was operating again at full capacity less than 30 minutes after the disruption.

¶12. (S) Two days after the incident, according to a credible source, security officials in Brazil were attributing the outage to "human error" on the part of a Brazilian national who is a system operator. Accordingly to the source, that operator was under investigation. Source is unavailable for further comment on whether evolving assessments may have affected that hypothesis and the status of that particular investigation is unknown. There was also private speculation in at least one conversation among some government officials, apparently based in part of the coincidental "60 Minutes program" just days earlier suggesting vulnerabilities in the Brazilian system, that U.S. private sector interests may have engineered the blackouts to gain better commercial access to the grid.

INTERIM STEPS TO PREVENT SECURITY AND OUTAGE INCIDENTS

¶13. (C) Geraldes acknowledged that the spotlight of the Olympic Games brings an increased scrutiny of the system. ONS has a protocol to guard against electricity disruptions which has been utilized during special events such as the Pan Am Games in 2007 and will be used in upcoming events including the 2014 World Cup and the 2016 Olympics. The protocol includes running all thermal plants, many of these located close to major cities including Rio, during the event to ensure multiple sources of generation. Regular maintenance is deferred during the event to minimize the possibility of disruption and regular transmission patterns are maintained to ensure the consistency of normal flow. Geraldes acknowledged actual physical security was a low priority under this protocol and said no special plans were made even during events. As Geraldes said, "That has been less of a concern for us than for you." However he agreed that there could be an increased focus on physical security in advance of the games, particularly after this incident has called attention to possible weaknesses in the system.

¶14. (C) The perspective from MME was somewhat different. Coimbra noted that "we are not immune from the kinds of threats that you have seen in recent years." There is a group in President LulaLuiz Inácio Lula da Silva (Garanhuns, 27 de outubro de 1945), mais conhecido como Lula, é um político e ex-sindicalista brasileiro. Ele foi o trigésimo quinto presidente da República Federativa do Brasil, iniciando seu mandato em 2003 e terminando em 1º de janeiro de 2011.’s office known as the Cabinet for Infrastructure Security (GSI) that is looking at infrastructure security. Coimbra recalled that they were the first to contact him after the incident. Grudtner is tasked with leading the Ministry’s own effort on physical security and he said BRASILIA 00001383 004 OF 005 that the MME working group is in the process of defining which installations are of greatest concern/most integral to the system, and therefore in need of physical protection.

¶15. (C) ONS officials told Econoff that there was also an intensive process going on at the Energy Planning Agency, EPE, to develop recommendations for how to avoid outage problems in the future. One immediate measure Brazil has undertaken to guard against a repeat occurrence during the investigation period is reducing the amount of flow in any one direction to take the pressure off the system – but with the by-product of increased reliance on the more expensive thermo plants, increasing the price of electricity. Another longer-term option under consideration would be to build newer, larger, and therefore stronger transmission equipment; an expensive option that the ONS contacts intimated would not be worth the price to avoid a highly unlikely repeat of the November 10 blackout. 16. (SBU) ONS shared the country’s five year plan for energy which plans for significant increases in energy demand, to be largely met in the near term with new hydro plants and increases in oil-fueled electric plants. While projections show sufficient electricity to meet demand, Geraldes cautioned the picture could change if there are unanticipated delays in completing the Belo Monte hydro plant due to come on line in April of 2014, just a few months in advance of the July World Cup.

¶17. (C) Though MME’s Coimbra did not offer any thoughts for what might be technological recommendations after this event, he did say that one area of focus for the GOB in a lessons learned-type exercise would be improving communications with the public during such events, as well as in advance of anticipated maintenance that could cause temporary outages. He was interested in learning more about the U.S. Emergency Broadcast system as one possible way of handling this challenge. Econoff committed to research the U.S. program and send information to see whether cooperation on this front was feasible.

MANAGING THE POLITICS

¶18. (C) Both MME and ONS were eager to put the November 10 blackout in perspective. ONS offered a slide that showed other comparable international blackouts over the last 30 years, including the four day East Coast blackout in 2003, detailing both the extent and duration of the blackouts; a cmparison in which the Brazil blackout fared well. Coimbra told Econoff that an American engineering association had sent an official letter of congratulations to the Center for Electrical Research, CEPAL, on the rapid recovery of the system and inviting them to a U.S. conference in the first part of next year to share their experiences. Both ONS and MME point out how quickly most of the system came back (the majority of the affected areas experienced outages of 20 minutes and the longest outage was six hours in Sao Paulo). As Grudtner said, the electrical sector was happy because the system functioned as it should have and came back comparatively quickly, but the politicians are not. Meanwhile, he noted wryly, the press is pleased to have fodder for its reports. Congress has called for hearings on the incident which have had to be postponed because experts were traveling to the area on a fact finding mission in order to complete the investigation report.

COMMENT: NOTABLE OPENNESS TO DIALOGUE WITH USG

¶19. (C) Brazilian officials were strikingly open to discussing the incident with Embassy personnel, non-defensive in response to questions, and forthcoming with their information and assessments. The willingness of the President of ONS and MME Chief of Staff to meet on such a technical issue and provide detailed information to the Embassy demonstrates the importance they place on ensuring the USG has an understanding of the blackout and Brazil’s capability to handle major events in the future. Blackouts in Brazil are not uncommon (in fact Rio experienced another blackout on November 23 which has been attributed to disruptions in transmission, possibly due to stolen cables). However, the scale of the November 10 blackout, which garnered undesired international attention, may prompt Brazil to seek long-lasting solutions to weaknesses in and threats to its electricity supply. Heading into a major election year, the GOB will likely want to show they are taking measures to rebuild public trust. In light of the openness displayed by GOB officials in discussing this event, combined with a desire to show progress on addressing the issue, the USG has an opportunity to work BRASILIA 00001383 005 OF 005 with the GOB as they seek to identify possible improvements that will yield real results in the physical security and reliability of its network.

OPPORTUNITIES FOR USG ENGAGEMENT – SEIZE THE MOMENT

¶20. (C) Having devoted much time and many resources to correcting problems in national electricity supply that were endemic in 2001, the GOB is proud of its interlinked national transmission system and has tended to view the blackouts that do occur as isolated incidents or as problems with local distribution systems. On recent visits to the United States, Energy Deputy Minister Zimmermann suggested that transmission and long-range distribution might be a subject in which Brazil has expertise it could share with the United States in an energy cooperation agreement. While GOB will be highly resistant to the idea that other countries are more advanced than they are in transmission and distribution, GOB officials do acknowledge there is some room for improvement in their system. We will know more about the immediate cause of Brazil’s major blackout in a few weeks but in the meantime, there are opportunities for the USG to take advantage of GOB’s openness, highlighting the outage as reason for more engagement as well as preparations toward the 2014 World Cup and 2016 Olympics.

CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE SECURITY COOPERATION OPPORTUNITIES

¶21. (C) This would be an excellent occasion to encourage the military to military Communication and Information Security Memorandum of Agreement (CISMOA), noting that although this incident does not appear to have been the result of an attack on the system, such an event is possible and signing this agreement would permit cooperation were one to occur. We could also consider a cybersecurity working group. Brazil might be open to pursuing cooperation on critical infrastructure protection, and MME has already told us they would be interested in learning more about our emergency broadcasting system. It is clear that physical security has not heretofore been a major focus for planners but officials acknowledge the possibility of an attack and are working on developing protections, another possible area for fruitful cooperation as a follow up from DHS visit in the later part of 2008.

INFRASTRUCTURE DEVELOPMENT COOPERATION OPPORTUNITIES

¶22. (C) Regarding infrastructure development, USTDA is now exploring the possibility of sponsoring an orientation visit or a field study on electrical power. Up to this point, USTDA has not pursued cooperation in the electrical area. Most infrastructure projects in this centralized electrical system are at the federal level, which generally translates into more bureaucracy and longer implementation times than projects undertaken at the state or local level. There are, however, electrical distribution issues which need to be addressed at the state and local levels that could benefit from USTDA involvement, possibly offering another means of engagement to help Brazil solve its electrical challenges. Prior to this event, the Energy Ministry had highlighted Smartgrid technology as one area that would be of interest to them in cooperation, perhaps more so now.

¶23. (C) Mission encourages USG agencies, including DOD, DHS, FCC, TDA and others, to explore these opportunities in the near-term. END COMMENT. 24. (U) This cable has been coordinated with ConGens Rio de Janeiro and Sao Paulo. JACKSON

 

 

 

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C O N F I D E N T I A L BRASILIA 001439

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 2019/12/24

TAGS: PREL BR KOLY ASEC PGOV

SUBJECT: 2016 Rio Olympics – The Future is Now

REF: BRASILIA 347; BRASILIA 278

CLASSIFIED BY: Lisa Kubiske, Charge d’Affaires a.i.; REASON: 1.4(D)

¶1. (C) SUMMARY. Brazilians greeted the October 1 announcement that the 2016 Summer Olympics were awarded to Rio de Janeiro with an outpouring of national pride, a party on Copacabana beach and a sense of relief that the country is gaining some long overdue recognition as a regional and international leader. Politically, the GOB is looking to capitalize on hosting the games to solidify Brazil’s image as the leader of South America and as an emerging global player. Internally, the IOC decision is being portrayed as a validation of President LulaLuiz Inácio Lula da Silva (Garanhuns, 27 de outubro de 1945), mais conhecido como Lula, é um político e ex-sindicalista brasileiro. Ele foi o trigésimo quinto presidente da República Federativa do Brasil, iniciando seu mandato em 2003 e terminando em 1º de janeiro de 2011.’s administration. The GOB understands that it faces critical challenges in preparing for the 2016 Games and has shown greater openness in such areas as information sharing to cooperation with the USG as a result – even going so far as to admit there could be a possibility of terrorist threats. The LulaLuiz Inácio Lula da Silva (Garanhuns, 27 de outubro de 1945), mais conhecido como Lula, é um político e ex-sindicalista brasileiro. Ele foi o trigésimo quinto presidente da República Federativa do Brasil, iniciando seu mandato em 2003 e terminando em 1º de janeiro de 2011. government has taken care to associate LulaLuiz Inácio Lula da Silva (Garanhuns, 27 de outubro de 1945), mais conhecido como Lula, é um político e ex-sindicalista brasileiro. Ele foi o trigésimo quinto presidente da República Federativa do Brasil, iniciando seu mandato em 2003 e terminando em 1º de janeiro de 2011.’s chosen candidate to succeed him in 2011, Dilma Rousseff, with the IOC decision and expects the euphoria engendered by Rio’s selection to translate into higher poll numbers for Rouseff. There remain, however, significant problems, that could impact the success of the Games , especially in terms of addressing security concerns. The Brazilian leadership remains highly sensitive to perceptions of USG interference and has not begun preparations for international coordination. In addition to preparing for the commercial opportunities the games will afford U.S. businesses, the USG should look to leverage Brazilian interest in an Olympic success to progress in bilateral cooperation in such areas as security and information exchanges. END SUMMARY.

¶2. (SBU) Amid the celebrations of the October 1 selection of Rio de Janeiro to host the 2016 Olympics there runs a strong current of relief among Brazilian leaders. President LulaLuiz Inácio Lula da Silva (Garanhuns, 27 de outubro de 1945), mais conhecido como Lula, é um político e ex-sindicalista brasileiro. Ele foi o trigésimo quinto presidente da República Federativa do Brasil, iniciando seu mandato em 2003 e terminando em 1º de janeiro de 2011. described the feeling as "the end of the street dog complex," the idea that Brazil somehow does not deserve the status of an important country. Ministry of External Relations (MRE) Coordinator for Sporting Cooperation Vera Alvarez noted that being the first South American country chosen to host the Games was seen as evidence that the world (or at least the IOC) recognized Brazilian primacy on the continent and regional leadership. Alvarez also echoed a view expressed commonly in the Brazilian press: Rio’s competitors had been Chicago (the United States), Madrid (the EU) and Tokyo (the Pacific Rim), and its victory must therefore reflect Brazil’s perceived comparative success in dealing with the global financial crisis. "The IOC appreciated that we were the first to emerge from the crisis," she said.

¶3. (SBU) Asked what Brazil’s goals for hosting the Games were, Alvarez repeated President LulaLuiz Inácio Lula da Silva (Garanhuns, 27 de outubro de 1945), mais conhecido como Lula, é um político e ex-sindicalista brasileiro. Ele foi o trigésimo quinto presidente da República Federativa do Brasil, iniciando seu mandato em 2003 e terminando em 1º de janeiro de 2011.’s assertion that these would be the "games of South America" and said that the GOB was planning to open its borders to its neighbors to encourage attendance by sports fans from all over the continent. Presidential Chief of Staff and likely presidential candidate Dilma Rousseff said the Games will provide opportunities for a younger generation of Brazilians and said the government would make numbers of tickets available to the youth of South America. Alvarez likened the effect of hosting the Games on Rio to that of the arrival of the Portuguese court in 1808, when Rio went from coastal town to the capital of an empire. She then went on to promise that the 2016 games would be the "greenest" Olympics yet and would improve Brazil’s international image with their success.

¶4. (C) Though Brazil has some experience with major events such as the Pan Am Games, the Olympics will be an unprecedented challenge. The great question mark concerning Rio’s selection has been the security situation, a question brought to the fore on October 17 as a gunfight between drug gangs resulted in the shooting down of a police helicopter (Ref c). MRE contacts have been defensive on security issues, telling Mission Brazil members (often without being asked) that the IOC clearly did not consider Rio’s security situation inadequate. Apart from the standard MRE response, however, GOB officials have shown an understanding that security will be a serious concern for the Games. MRE political military advisor Marcos Pinta Gama suggested that the pending General Security of Military Information Agreement (GSOMIA) could be followed by another arrangement to share security information for the Olympics. Alvarez went so far as to admit that terrorists could target Brazil because of the Olympics, a highly unusual statement from a government that officially believes terrorism in Brazil does not exist. The SENASP (the National Secretariat for Public Security, Ministry of Justice) has been put in charge of security for the Olympics and will be coordinating the GOB’s overall on-the-ground security efforts. Rio authorities, meanwhile, expressed confidence in the impact the Favela Pacification Plan (Ref d) will have on the city’s overall security. The Plan – which involves evicting drug traffickers, establishing a sustained police presence, and providing basic services to favela residents – envisions the "pacification" of over 100 favela communities by 2016 (Ref e). Internal Politics

¶5. (SBU) Even before the selection of Rio, the LulaLuiz Inácio Lula da Silva (Garanhuns, 27 de outubro de 1945), mais conhecido como Lula, é um político e ex-sindicalista brasileiro. Ele foi o trigésimo quinto presidente da República Federativa do Brasil, iniciando seu mandato em 2003 e terminando em 1º de janeiro de 2011. government was hard at work to turn the decision to political advantage. LulaLuiz Inácio Lula da Silva (Garanhuns, 27 de outubro de 1945), mais conhecido como Lula, é um político e ex-sindicalista brasileiro. Ele foi o trigésimo quinto presidente da República Federativa do Brasil, iniciando seu mandato em 2003 e terminando em 1º de janeiro de 2011.’s chosen candidate to succeed him, Chief of Staff Dilma Rousseff, was at his side in Copenhagen for the selection, an appearance which Sport Minister Orlando Silva declared "will help Dilma’s candidacy." LulaLuiz Inácio Lula da Silva (Garanhuns, 27 de outubro de 1945), mais conhecido como Lula, é um político e ex-sindicalista brasileiro. Ele foi o trigésimo quinto presidente da República Federativa do Brasil, iniciando seu mandato em 2003 e terminando em 1º de janeiro de 2011.’s highly visible role in lobbying for the Games is portrayed domestically as international validation of his administration and recognition of LulaLuiz Inácio Lula da Silva (Garanhuns, 27 de outubro de 1945), mais conhecido como Lula, é um político e ex-sindicalista brasileiro. Ele foi o trigésimo quinto presidente da República Federativa do Brasil, iniciando seu mandato em 2003 e terminando em 1º de janeiro de 2011. as a key world player. Indeed, the reality is that much of the actual planning and preparation for Rio’s bid was done by the Rio state and municipal governments. However, Rio authorities counted on LulaLuiz Inácio Lula da Silva (Garanhuns, 27 de outubro de 1945), mais conhecido como Lula, é um político e ex-sindicalista brasileiro. Ele foi o trigésimo quinto presidente da República Federativa do Brasil, iniciando seu mandato em 2003 e terminando em 1º de janeiro de 2011. coming in over the top and providing the international prestige needed to win. In a recent meeting, Rio governor Cabral explained to Consul General in colorful detail LulaLuiz Inácio Lula da Silva (Garanhuns, 27 de outubro de 1945), mais conhecido como Lula, é um político e ex-sindicalista brasileiro. Ele foi o trigésimo quinto presidente da República Federativa do Brasil, iniciando seu mandato em 2003 e terminando em 1º de janeiro de 2011.’s tireless lobbying efforts in Copenhagen. According to Silva "The opposition will just have to swallow LulaLuiz Inácio Lula da Silva (Garanhuns, 27 de outubro de 1945), mais conhecido como Lula, é um político e ex-sindicalista brasileiro. Ele foi o trigésimo quinto presidente da República Federativa do Brasil, iniciando seu mandato em 2003 e terminando em 1º de janeiro de 2011.’s leadership." By claiming credit for Rio’s victory, LulaLuiz Inácio Lula da Silva (Garanhuns, 27 de outubro de 1945), mais conhecido como Lula, é um político e ex-sindicalista brasileiro. Ele foi o trigésimo quinto presidente da República Federativa do Brasil, iniciando seu mandato em 2003 e terminando em 1º de janeiro de 2011. seeks to bolster his already high approval ratings and then use his popularity to build support for Dilma Rousseff in the October 2010 Presidential election. As a first step, the Administration has announced a special Olympic Program for Acceleration of Growth (PAC) under Rousseff’s leadership. One of LulaLuiz Inácio Lula da Silva (Garanhuns, 27 de outubro de 1945), mais conhecido como Lula, é um político e ex-sindicalista brasileiro. Ele foi o trigésimo quinto presidente da República Federativa do Brasil, iniciando seu mandato em 2003 e terminando em 1º de janeiro de 2011.’s signature initiatives, the PAC is a plan to use government resources to leverage private sector investment in infrastructure ( ref a). While PAC implementation has been extremely slow, the program has a positive image among Brazilians, and by putting Rousseff in the lead, Lula helps build her up as the candidate to prepare Rio for the Games.

Comment

¶6. (C) Being awarded the Olympics is seen as a major victory for Brazil in what Brazilians see as a struggle for the recognition they deserve. "We are finished being the country of the future and are the country of the present," Rousseff stated. The risk is that the GOB may choose to rest on its laurels and not get started on the work of planning the Games – Games that Lula has already dubbed a great success. Despite Rousseff’s affirmation that "we have learned from the Pan Am Games," coordination for the 2014 World Cup, especially on security, lags. Attempts by Embassy personnel to establish contact with the Ministry of Sport have been refused. The GOB has articulated a vision for the Games – an Olympiad based on South American culture, openness to youth and environmentally friendly that played well in terms of domestic politics as well as appealing to the IOC. At this point, however, though state and municipal planning is moving ahead steadily, there has been little practical planning at the federal level for implementation of this grand vision. NOTE: Rio’s challenges in building infrastructure and paying for the Games will be reported septel. For example, to make events more accessible to the South American public, Lula has said the GOB will distribute free tickets to the working classes and the youth of the continent. MRE admitted that there had been no thought given to how this would impact on ticket revenue projections or security, or to how the potential flow of youthful spectators across Brazil’s borders would be managed. Rio also faces a host of challenges building infrastructure and paying for the Games. Lula has similarly decreed that Brazil will win more medals at the Rio Games than in the past, but there is no program in place to enhance the development of elite athletes.

¶7. (C) Brazil has shown it can host large-scale events such as the 2007 Pan Am Games, but the Olympics will present a different kind of challenge. While rejoicing in Rio’s victory, the current GOB, with less than a year to go in office, seems to be taking a relaxed approach to preparation. The UK Embassy reports they have had less contact with the GOB on the Olympics than we have, even though they are eager to share lessons learned from initial planning for London 2012. While the very weak Ministry of Sport currently has the nominal lead on coordinating Olympic preparations, Mission anticipates the next Administration may organize preparations differently, perhaps through the Ministry of Planning or Casa Civil, or even establish a new agency specifically to coordinate Olympics infrastructure and security planning and logistics. Although the police and military have begun planning, the reality may well be that serious efforts await the next government, which will take office January 2011.

¶8. (C) Articulating the big picture goals and leaving details to the last minute may be a typically Brazilian approach, but could lead to problems. The delays we expect from the GOB in planning and executing the preparatory works for a successful World Cup and Olympic Games will almost certainly place greater onus on the USG to ensure that necessary standards are met. Mission Brazil has already begun coordinating among USG agencies in Brasilia and Rio de Janeiro, and has begun forward planning for the significant increases in personnel, facilities, and resources that managing U.S. involvement in the Games will require. Given the high degree of interest in the Olympics among Brazilians and the high value Brazil places on conducting a successful Games, there are already opportunities for the USG to pursue cooperation toward the Games, and to use such cooperation to further broader USG objectives in Brazil, including increased cooperation and Brazilian expertise on counterterrorism activities. As we look ahead, taking advantage of the Games to work security issues should be a priority, as should cooperation on cybercrime and broader information security (see ref B for additional areas for potential cooperation). We should also look to build in offers for dialogue on preparations for major sporting events as part of all high-level contacts with the Brazilians. KUBISKE

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