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Wikileaks EUA-Brasil: 10 Novos Documentos: Brasil e Irã
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TAGS: PREL KNNP IR CH BR
SUBJECT: BRAZIL: AMBASSADOR’S MEETINGS WITH MRE UNDER SECRETARIES FOR
POLITICAL AFFAIRS
REF: STATE 12108
CLASSIFIED BY: Thomas A. Shannon, Ambassador, State, Embassy
Brasilia; REASON: 1.4(B), (D)
¶1. (C) Summary. In separate meetings with Ambassador Shannon February 9, MRE Under Secretaries for Political Affairs I Vera Machado and Political Affairs II Roberto Jaguaribe both focused on concerns that Iranian domestic issues would make a solution to the nuclear issues difficult to achieve. Machado, who covers relations with the United States, among other issues, said the GOB is looking forward to a visit by Secretary Clinton and focused the discussion on South America regional issues. Jaguaribe, who is responsible for East, Central, and South Asia and Iran, spoke at length about Brazil’s views on Iran, relations with China, and the upcoming BRIC (Brazil, Russia, India, and China) summit in Brasilia. End summary. Iran and Nuclear Issues
¶2. (C) Consistent with his message in previous engagements, Jaguaribe offered broad praise for President Obama’s efforts to "interface with Iran in a more comprehensive way," and emphasized that Iran’s eventual acceptance of the core P5+1 proposal is the only plausible solution to the crisis. Jaguaribe expressed doubts that Iran would accept the solution in its current political climate, and suggested that the strong anti-Iranian positions taken in the United States and the European Union have conditioned the Iranian government and people to think that any offer made by the United States cannot be acceptable. Jaguaribe called Iran’s nuclear program an expression of national identity, a symbol galvanizing popular support for the regime. Likewise he viewed any sanctions as automatically strengthening the position of hard-line elements in the Iranian government. He strongly encouraged more engagement with Iran before considering sanctions in the UN. Jaguaribe said that third-party engagement – including Turkey, but "not necessarily Brazil" – would be a key to success given Iranian skepticism of the United States and Europe as primary messengers. He expressed interest in continuing discussion with U.S. officials concerning Iran. For her part, Machado, who also covers non-proliferation and UNSC issues, reiterated the GOB view that Iran has a right to peaceful nuclear power, but expressed concern about how the situation with Iran was developing. She suggested a "new path" was needed, but like Jaguaribe, she worried that multiple centers of power within Iran would make it difficult to find a way forward. Iran and Human Rights
¶3. (C) When pressed about human rights in Iran, Jaguaribe acknowledged a negative and worsening situation but also asked why we were singling out Iran when several of its neighbors are less democratic with worse human rights performance. The Ambassador laid out the concerns in reftel, including our objections to Iran’s potential bid for a seat on the UN Human Rights Council. Jaguaribe had no immediate response to the demarche points but emphasized that Brazil has registered its human rights concerns with Iran several times, particularly concerning treatment of the Baha’i. He added that Iran’s increased use of paramilitaries in order to maintain order is a sign of the regime’s weakness. Jaguaribe acknowledged the Brazilian’s Embassy lack of capacity to assess popular support for the government but still spoke of Iran’s government as essentially stable and capable of reaching and honoring agreements. Regional Stability
¶4. (C) Machado said the GOB would welcome a visit by Secretary Clinton and discussed a number of Brazil’s neighbors with the Ambassador. She said that Brazil is watching the situation in Venezuela carefully, noting that Chavez faces a number of internal problems. She thought that there was a chance for improvement following the September 2010 legislative elections because there were a number of "lesser known" political figures who may emerge with more influence. Machado believed that the situation in Bolivia had stabilized but remained concerned about connections between the government and coca growers. She acknowledged the threat to the region of drug trafficking but identified the primary source of the problem as consumption in rich countries. Building with BRICs
¶5. (C) Recently returned from a trip to China in preparation for the April 15-16 BRIC summit in Brasilia, Jaguaribe spoke candidly about the difficulties in developing an agenda and an overall mission for BRIC. China, he felt, presented a particular challenge to Brazil given different perceptions by the Chinese about what a group like BRIC would mean. Jaguaribe emphasized that China is very cautious not to make BRIC look like a group opposing the interests of established powers and as a result works to make the agenda less than fully precise. China is also especially sensitive to concerns from developing nations that don’t want BRIC to purport to speak as the voice for developing countries. The Under Secretary also spoke about the difficulty of organizing a group agenda under these circumstances, commenting, "This is a very heterogeneous group of countries with different goals, but the interest is there." China: The "Communist Dynasty"
¶6. (C) Jaguaribe joked that the Chinese government would one day be referred to as the "Communist Dynasty," and expressed minor exasperation about the difficulty of finding the right person in the government to talk with about major issues. Ambassador Shannon noted that China’s capacity to engage successfully in South America has evolved rapidly. What began as a commercial and trade-based relationship is now gaining a political component. The Chinese, he noted, are constantly evaluating their performance and improving their game. He told Jaguaribe, "China will be a tough competitor, for the United States and Brazil." SHANNON
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TAGS: PARM PREL IR UNSC BR
REF: 10 STATE 9124; STATE 120288 DERIVED FROM: Derived from previous message.
¶1. (C) ChargC) delivered the reftel demarche Jabnuary 29 to Ministry for External Relations (MRE) Under Secretary for Political Affairs Vera Machado. Machado asked if the USG and P5+1 partners were seeking additional sanctions against Iran at the present time and if the issue had been placed on the UNSC agenda yet. Machado expressed concern about the position of China, saying that she believed China would oppose putting the matter on the UNSC agenda. When asked Brazil’s views by ChargC), Machado said that the GOB would like to postpone any additional pressure against Iran because internal instability there would unify Iranians behind "extremist elements" in the face of external pressure.
¶2. (C) In a separate discussion with PolOff, MRE Director for Disarmament Santiago Mourao asked about USG and P5+1 reaction to Iran’s "counterproposal" to the IAEA plan for its low enriched uranium. He noted that Brazil did not believe new sanctions would be effective and said he understood that Russia and China shared this view. Mourao said he understood that the USG was seeking a "rebalancing" between engagement and pressure and would make sure his superiors understood this. 3. (U) The meeting with the Brazilian MRE occurred the day after Foreign Minister Celso Amorim met with Iranian Foreign Minister Motaki in Davos to hear what he described as "new ideas" as an alternative to the IAEA plan for nuclear fuel. Amorim warned that "threats and sanctions haven’t been working. We are keeping a dialogue with (Iran)."
XXX
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SECTION 01 OF 03 BRASILIA 001368
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/25/2019
TAGS: PGOV PREL PHUM AORC CASC BR IR
SUBJECT: AHMADINEJAD VISIT READOUT: A WELL-SCRIPTED AFFAIR
REF: A. BRASILIA 1341
¶B. BRASILIA 1300
¶C. BRASILIA 1230
BRASILIA 00001368 001.2 OF 003
Classified By: Acting Charge D’Affaires Cherie Jackson for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).
¶1. (SBU) This message covers our initial readout of the visit to Brazil by Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. Follow-up messages will be sent once we obtain a more in-depth readout of the conversation between President Lula and President Ahmadinejad.
Summary ——-
¶2. (C) President Lula welcomed President Ahmadinejad to Brazil on November 23, calling him a "good friend" and publicly supporting Iran’s right to a nuclear program for civilian use, but declined public comment on the actual aims of Iran’s nuclear program, the IAEA/P5 1 proposal, or the state of democracy and human rights in Iran. Ahmadinejad’s public comments were relatively restrained, including a lengthy endorsement of Brazil’s main goal — UN Security Council reform and a permanent UNSC seat for Brazil. He also said of the 5 1 offer that Iran "in principle agrees with the proposal presented," before backtracking. Ahmadinejad and Lula met privately for three hours, but we have no solid information yet about their conversation. The visit featured the signing of several expected bilaterals, including agreements to promote commercial cooperation and to exempt diplomatic passport holders of certain visa requirements. Ahmadinejad’s visit illustrated critical foreign policy differences between Lula’s PT and other political parties; front-running 2010 presidential candidate Jose Serra (PSDB) wrote an editorial opposing the visit. A planned early evening speech by Ahmadinejad in a local university was canceled, in part because the crowd was hostile and security precautions were weak. End summary.
Three-Hour Meeting ——————
¶3. (C) After arriving late morning, Ahmadinejad spoke with President Lula in Itamaraty (Ministry of Foreign Relations, or MRE) for three hours before advancing to the press conference. (Note: In part, the length of the meeting might be due to the necessity of interpreting from Farsi to English to Portuguese and back again throughout. End note.) MRE officials have told us that, as is standard for such meetings, no one at MRE below Foreign Minister Celso Amorim was present for any length of time. In a conversation with poloff the following day, Ricardo Luis Pires Ribeiro, Iran/Central Asia Desk Director and control officer for the Ahmadinejad visit, expressed confidence based on his post-visit conversations with Lula’s staff that the President of Brazil had pressed Ahmadinejad to accept the 5 1 proposal and that "progress had been made." Pires saw Lula when he emerged from the meeting with Ahmadinejad, visibly tired, to tell his staff he was "satisfied" with the conversation.
Press Conference —————-
¶4. (SBU) During the late afternoon press conference, Lula made clear that Brazil "defends the right of Iran to develop and enrich uranium for the production of energy for peaceful purposes," pointing out that Brazil is defending the same rights for itself as it develops its own civilian nuclear technology. He also emphasized that nuclear disarmament and civilian technology must advance together. Lula encouraged Iran to continue talking with the international community to reach a solution with regard to its nuclear program. He did not offer any value judgments on the actual status or aims of Iran’s nuclear programs, nor did he make any statements endorsing or otherwise evaluating the 5 1 proposal. Nor did Lula directly address the health of democracy and human rights in Iran, although he did make several general statements about human rights and tolerance in his remarks at the joint press event that were clearly designed to appease critics of Iran’s human rights record.
¶5. (C) Ahmadinejad’s public statement was also relatively restrained, emphasizing the need for UN Security Council reform — including a permanent UNSC seat for Brazil — and IMF reforms, among other objectives. His public remarks were much milder than the prepared remarks sent by the Iranian Embassy to the media the previous night, which blamed the United States for a multitude of sins and strongly suggested
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Brazilian solidarity in these views. Pires said that Itamaraty had been alarmed upon seeing those remarks, and that Lula in turn agreed to press Ahmadinejad during the meeting to tone down his comments at the joint press conference. The result was a speech that often sounded unrehearsed, spoke in generalities, and criticized "the west" rather than specific nations.
¶6. (SBU) Only one question was permitted from the media — a question about the aims of Iran’s nuclear program — which Lula promptly deflected to Ahmadinejad without giving a substantive answer. Ahmadinejad spoke at length, claiming that Iran had met all IAEA requirements and asserting Iran’s preferred solution to purchase fuel to enrich uranium. He later said that Iran "in principle agrees with the (P5 1) proposal presented," and that the Iranian government "wants to finalize an accord." He then backtracked, issuing a series of vague complaints about hegemomy and imperialism, and blaming the various actions of past U.S. presidents for creating Iran’s current predicament. Ahmadinejad generally stayed on the joint Iran-Brazilian message about the right to nuclear enrichment for peaceful means.
Voices of Dissent —————–
¶7. (C) The President of Iran’s visit provoked several demonstrations from civilian groups across the country, including in Rio De Janeiro, Sao Paulo, Curitiba, and Florianopolis. The Jewish, Baha’i, and GLBT communities were most prominent, often protesting together. Ahmadinejad had been scheduled to address students in the early evening at a local Brasilia university, IESB, in an event roughly modeled on the 2007 Ahmadinejad engagement at Columbia University. According to Pires, MRE recommended canceling shortly before the engagement upon finding that the 1,000 students waiting in line included a large number of protestors and that the police had not properly vetted the site for security concerns until the morning of the visit. After returning to his hotel, Ahmadinejad apparently still planned to attend but later changed his mind and held another short press conference at his hotel, in which he made more pointed remarks about the United States, Israel, the Holocaust, and other topics.
What the Ahmadinejad Visit Reveals About Brazilian Politics ——————————————— ————–
¶8. (SBU) The Ahmadinejad visit revealed sharp differences in foreign policy world views among Brazilian political parties, which figure to help shape Brazil’s approach to Iran after the October 2010 presidential and congressional elections. On November 23, front-running presidential contender Jose Serra (PSDB) published an editorial in Sao Paulo’s Folha newspaper strongly criticzing Ahmadinejad’s visit. In his op-ed Serra drew contrasts with Lula by characterizing Iran’s recent presidential elections as fraudulent, condemning Iranian support of terrorist activities beyond its borders (including in Argentina), and arguing that Brazil must not undermine its case as an aspirant to a UNSC permanent seat by standing next to a government that does not meet its IAEA obligations. Other PSDB members were even more vocal against the visit, as was the center-right opposition Democratas (DEM) party.
¶9. (C) While members of Lula’s Worker’s Party (PT) defended the visit in public and in private conversations with us, often with mild reservations, other parties within the President’s governing coalition have been decidedly less enthusiatic. Senate President Jose Sarney and Chamber of Deputies President Michel Temer, both from PMDB, the largest party in Congress, met briefly with Ahmadinejad; the discussion with Temer was frosty, with Sarney it was non-substantive. Chamber Presidency staff later told poloff that Temer did not want to do the meeting, calling it "a necessary matter of protocol but still embarrassing." He had been resigned to the meeting’s eventuality after giving the green light for Israeli President Shimon Peres to speak to a joint session of Congress earlier in the month (Peres and Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas visits to be reported septel). Other leading figures within the governing coalition were more strongly negative, including Senator Francisco Dornelles (PP), who told poloff the visit was a "travesty."
Comment: A Qualified Success for Lula ————————————-
¶10. (C) Although the way both Ahmadinejad and Lula have handled previous visits created concern about what each might BRASILIA 00001368 003.2 OF 003 say, this visit turned out to be unexpectedly tame. Gone was the tone from the November 20 visit by President Abbas, when Lula blamed the United States for problems in the Middle East and said the USG should not be mediating discussion in the region. By taking the unusual step of sticking to the tight script provided by Itamaraty and his advisors, Lula was able to lay out Brazil’s key foreign policy goals — a UNSC permanent seat, development of a domestic nuclear program, and an increased profile in the world — without raising further red flags. While we do not yet know the full content of Lula’s three-hour discussion with Ahmadinejad, Brazil’s apparent success in strongly reining in Ahmadinejad’s prepared public discourse indicates that he took Lula’s advice seriously. Lula and Itamaraty almost certainly achieved their own goals with the visit, but thee objectives have not been well communicated to he Brazilian public, media, or other political prties, nor is it likely that they will be in advance of Lula’s planned visit to Iran, scheduled fo April 2010. Brazil’s relations with Iran will reain a contentious issue domestically, which suggsts that the GOB’s emerging friendship with Iranwill continue to be carefully qualified and open to revision. End comment.
JACKSON
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SECTION 01 OF 03 BRASILIA 001300
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/06/2019
TAGS: PREL KIRF KNNP CVIS BR IR
SUBJECT: BRAZIL ON AHMADINEJAD, IRAN’S NUCLEAR PROGRAM, AND VISAS
REF: A. BRASILIA 1170
¶B. BRASILIA 1112
¶C. BRASILIA 773
¶D. BRASILIA 658
¶E. BRASILIA 477
¶F. BRASILIA 387
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Classified By: Charge D’Affaires Lisa Kubiske for reasons 1.4 (b) and ( d).
¶1. (U) Paragraphs 2 and 8 contain Mission Brazil action request.
¶2. (C) Summary and Action Request. With Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s November 23 visit approaching, President Lula has not adopted a position on the IAEA (P5 1) Geneva proposal or the Iran nuclear program as a whole, although Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MRE or Itamaraty) senior officials praised the P5 1 proposal and assured that Brazil would quietly support sanctions against Iran in the UN if IAEA-based talks fall through. Iran and Brazil are expected to sign several bilateral agreements during the visit, including an agreement to waive visa requirements for holders of diplomatic passports traveling on orders. Senior officials in MRE and the President’s office say that Lula will discuss human rights issues with Iran, largely becuse of pressure from Brazilian civil society, but is only prepared to talk about the nuclear issue in general terms. MRE acknowledged worries that Lula and his advisors will be publicly seen as overly friendly to Iran during the visit. Ahmadinejad’s visit will follow closely on the heels of visits by Israeli President Shimon Peres (Nov. 11) and Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas (Nov. 14). Under Secretary for Political Affairs Vera Machado explained to the Charge d’Affaires on October 28 that Lula believes, based on his previous conversations with President Obama, that his communication with Iran and the Middle East will be appreciated by the USG and western governments. Lula and his inner circle of advisors do not appear to fully grasp the negative feedback that will be created by the Iran visit, nor the potential policy complexities involved with hosting so many regional leaders at once. Action Request: As Brazil makes clear that it will continue to pursue a more active role in the Middle East, Mission renews its request for a Washington regional expert to meet with senior counterpart officials about Iran and broader Middle East issues. End Summary and Action Request.
Brazil and the IAEA Proposal —————————-
¶3. (C) In his October 27 and subsequent meetings with poloff, MRE Iran/Central Asia Desk Director Roberto Luis Pires Ribeiro da Silva praised the multilateral approach of the IAEA proposal made to Iran in Geneva, particularly the roles of Russia to enrich Iran’s low-enriched uranium (LEU) fuel and of France to convert the LEU to fuel plates. He said that the inclusion of these two countries, rather than the details of the proposal itself, were noticed by President Lula and his advisors. Pires said no decision has been taken by the GOB at the executive level to endorse the P5 1 IAEA proposal, even though the regional and science/technology desks at Itamaraty have recommended official support. He believed that Iran would "half-accept" the proposal originally but would eventually agree to make a one-time transfer of 1200 kg of LEU. (Other senior officials at MRE were less optimistic.) Pires emphasized, as in previous meetings (ref A), that if talks fell through and sanctions against Iran were proposed at the UN level, Brazil would vote in favor — but would be quiet about it. In a November 4 meeting, Presidential Foreign Policy Adviser Marcel Biato told the Charge d’Affaires that Lula would bring up nuclear issues with Ahmadinejad, recommending dialogue with western governments and reaching an IAEA-based solution, but has not committed to discussing P5 1 proposal specifics.
Ahmadinejad Visit: End of Visas for Iranians? ———————————————
¶4. (C) The MRE Central Asia/Iran division is busy preparing for Ahmadinejad’s November 23 visit. Pires said that the official agenda includes signing a series of pre-negotiated bilateral agreements, including an expected (but not yet finalized) agreement to waive bilateral visa requirements for bearers of diplomatic passports traveling on orders. In
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early November conversations, Pires and other MRE officials categorized as false October 27 Brazilian media reports that asserted, based on an interview with Iranian Deputy Foreign Minister Alireza Salari, that Iran and Brazil would reach an agreement to liberalize bilateral visa rules for all passports, giving Iran in effect visa waiver status to Brazil. According to Pires, there has been and will be no attempt to adjust visa access for normal or official passports. Other bilateral accords to be signed include a general economic assistance agreement, a more detailed agricultural assistance agreement outlining exchange of Iranian petrochemical inputs and fertilizers for Brazilian technology, and several memorandum of understanding, most notably one between each nation’s central bank. He characterized the agreements as "government to government," including nothing specific to Petrobras or other Brazilian companies that could fall under the Iran Sanctions Act.
Internal Pressure —————–
¶5. (C) Both Pires and MRE Middle East I (including Israel, Lebanon, and Syria) Desk Director Claudio Cesar Nascimento, who spoke briefly with poloff on October 28, noted that Itamaraty and Lula were getting pressured on a near-daily basis by Brazilian religious and ethnic minority groups opposed to the Iranian government’s activities. Brazil’s Jewish community has employed their senior members within the President’s party (PT) to advise Lula and his advisors against hosting Ahmadinejad. The Brazilian Baha’i community has also been very active and Syrian-Lebanese Christians have registered concerns on a more ad hoc basis. In response to public pressure, Pires said, Lula plans to press Ahmadinejad about release and treatment of Iran’s domestic religious and political detainees — including those arrested in the post-election demonstrations this summer. Pires nevertheless expressed concern Presidential Foreign Policy Advisor Marco Aurelio Garcia (who is especially close to Lula) would change the vanilla talking points and remarks being prepared by Itamaraty, setting the stage for the President to downplay human rights concerns in the meeting or to make public comments about Iran and Ahmadinejad that could be misconstrued. He suggested that Garcia had already done this prior to Ahmadinejad’s aborted visit in May (ref E).
Lula’s Justification ——————–
¶6. (C) As November 23 approaches, several local media outlets have published articles critical of the planned Ahmadinejad visit, posing essentially the same question raised by the USG and much of the international community: Why is Lula insisting on cultivating relations with Iran? In an October 28 meeting with the Charge d’Affaires, MRE Under Secretary Vera Machado provided insight into Lula’s thinking. Machado said that, during a brief discussion on Iran between Lula and President Obama at the July G8 Summit in L’Aquila, at which she was present, President Obama responded to Lula’s comments about wanting to meet with Iran by saying he would appreciate anything Lula could do to be helpful. Lula has interpreted this to mean that the USG tacitly supports Brazil’s efforts to engage Iran (and the broader Middle East) on key issues. According to Machado and other MRE officials, Lula has been most interested in raising issues such as detainee releases, human rights, and general questions. She confirmed that there is no indication that Lula is interested in discussing with Ahmadinejad the specifics of the IAEA Geneva proposal or Iran’s activities in neighboring countries.
Handling all the Visitors ————————-
¶7. (C) Handling agendas will be a delicate matter for Brazil, given the competing needs of its visitors this month, which include Israeli President Shimon Peres (Nov. 11), Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas (Nov. 14 or 15), and likely a rescheduled visit by Lebanese President Michel Sleiman after Ahmadinejad. According to MRE and the Israeli Deputy Chief of Mission, the Peres visit will feature signing of several bilateral economic accords similar to those to be signed during the Ahmadinejad visit. The Israeli Embassy is also pushing the Senate and Chamber of Deputies leadership for the opportunity to allow Peres to address both houses of Congress. Senior congressional staff told poloff that Chamber President Michel Temer and other key leaders were
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amenable to the idea and had received a green light (if not an endorsement) for the idea from the President Lula’s office. It now appears that Congress will not grant the request due to concerns that Ahmadinejad, in particular, would have to be given the same forum (which MRE reports he has not asked for). Itamaraty had not been aware of the Israeli Embassy’s request to Congress until early this week and has since sent signals that it would prefer that no visiting foreign leaders be given the podium in Congress.
Comment and Action Request ————————–
¶8. (C) Despite growing contacts and a small number of experts on the Middle East in Itamaraty, the GOB as a whole still does not fully grasp the regional and multilateral dynamics surrounding Iran and the Middle East, and its frenzied effort to reach out to all players in the region is increasing the potential for missteps and misunderstandings. We believe the GOB is misreading the views and actions of the United States and other key players on these issues, even as Brazil wades purposefully deeper into the Middle East. The upcoming visits of Ahmadinejad, Peres, Shimon, and Sleiman, combined with a likely January 2010 trip by President Lula to the region, are likely to compound, rather than alleviate, these problems, as Brazil seeks to burnish its image as the country that can talk to all sides. Additional USG engagement, perhaps in concert with Britain, France, and other key international players, will be needed to press our point of view and inform Brazil’s. Mission renews its request (ref B) for a Washington Middle East expert visit to Brasilia to address senior-level counterparts in the President’s office and Itamaraty to present our views. End Comment and Action Request.
KUBISKE
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E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/07/2019
TAGS: PREL PGOV KNNP BR IR
SUBJECT: QOM REPORT GETS THE BRAZILIANS THINKING
REF: A. BRASILIA 1170
¶B. BRASILIA 1103 BRASILIA 00001230 001.2 OF 002
Classified By: Charge D’Affairs Lisa Kubiske for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d ).
¶1. (C) Summary. During an October 1 meeting with poloff, Ministry of Foreign Relations (MRE or Itamaraty) Central Asia (including Iran, Afghanistan, Pakistan, India) Director Ricardo Luis Pires Ribeiro da Silva acknowledged that the September 24 report to the IAEA on the Qom nuclear facility challenges Brazil’s prevailing outlook that Iran is building a nuclear program primarily for civilian purposes. Pires shared his readout of President Lula’s September 23 meeting with Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad at UNGA, and emphasized that neither Lula nor Itamaraty knew anything substantive about the Qom report in advance of the meeting. Pires said that Itamaraty was particularly concerned that Israel would strike against the Qom facility quickly, even before sanctions could be agreed upon, if the Geneva talks did not appear to produce tangible results. In follow-up correspondence, Pires praised the USG for holding extended talks with Iran in Geneva. End summary.
Qom Nuclear Facility ——————–
¶2. (C) Pires, who had a chance to review the September 24 IAEA presentation talking points several days in advance of the meeting and confer with senior MRE officials about them, noted quickly and often that the Qom enrichment plant is different in nature from the Natanz enrichment plant. While he believed that Qom production levels could be viewed as suitable for research rather than weaponmaking, Pires feared that Israel would see the facility as an imminent threat even if access to IAEA inspectors were granted. He said the GOB believes Israel has a date in mind for bombing the facility if the Geneva talks fail or if strong sanctions are not established, and sought USG assurances that Israel would not take action soon. Pires reiterated support for the current USG approach to Israel-Palestine negotiations, but wondered if we were taking a harder line on Iran to keep the Israelis happy so that they would make concessions on West Bank settlements.
¶3. (C) Iran can be convinced to agree to a thorough IAEA inspection of the Qom facility, Pires said, though he acknowledged that this would not necessarily resolve concerns about the facility’s ultimate use. He believed that Russia would ultimately side with the United States, United Kingdom, and France on the core approach to Iran’s nuclear program, including a future decision to impose sanctions, which would place pressure on China to follow suit. He suggested that Brazil will be watching Russia closely for clues about how to position itself on the issue in the UN. Pires characterized Iran’s recent missile launch as "really stupid" and needlessly provocative to Israel especially, but also to countries like Russia, India, and Turkey. He believed there was a good chance that Iran had received technological upgrades from North Korea since their last missile launch.
Lula and Ahmadinejad at UNGA —————————-
¶4. (C) Pires also shared MRE’s readout of President Lula’s one-hour meeting with Ahmadinejad at UNGA on September 23, emphasizing several times that Lula told Ahmadinejad that IAEA access to all nuclear facilities will be needed to show that they will be used for civilian energy purposes. He said that Lula emerged from the meeting enthusiastic about developing further commercial relations with Iran and skeptical about reports of nuclear weaponmaking, as reported in the press. Pires emphasized, however, that Lula was not aware at the time of the forthcoming report to IAEA about the Qom facility, or at least not about the report’s content. Pires also said that Lula asked Ahmadinejad about the Holocaust toward the end of the meeting. According to the GOB report, Ahmadinejad acknowledged that it did, in fact, occur, and then went on a diatribe about Germany and the creation of the state of Israel. Pires described Lula’s response to a reporter’s subsequent question on Ahmadinejad’s recognition of the Holocaust as "unfortunate and not representative" of the discussion at the meeting.
BRASILIA 00001230 002.2 OF 002 O
ther Issues: Visitors, UNESCO ——————————
¶5. (C) MRE reconfirmed that Israeli President Shimon Peres will visit Brasilia on November 11. He said that no dates had been confirmed for visits by Ahmadinejad or Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas, but said that the Ahmadinejad visit will happen in late November, which would push back the Abbas visit into December at earliest.
¶6. (C) Pires also spoke briefly about Brazil’s decision to back Egyptian candidate Farouk Hosni over Irina Bokova for the UNESCO Director General (ref B). Several local publications have criticized the GOB position on this matter, calling it a "diplomatic defeat" dictated by Lula’s desire to strengthen relations with Iran and the Middle East. These same reports, apparently based on leaked sources from Itamaraty, also questioned why Brazil did not make the case to promote one of its own, UNESCO Deputy Director-General Marcio Barbosa. When asked about the matter, Pires smiled wryly, shook his head and said, "these are the things we have to do sometimes."
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DEPARTMENT FOR P (STEPHEN MULL)
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/06/2019
TAGS: PREL KNNP MNUC PARM BR
SUBJECT: BRIEFING ON OUTCOME OF P5+1 TALKS WITH IRAN IN GENEVA OCTOBER 1
REF: SECSTATE 103219 Classified By: Political Counselor Stephen Liston. Reason: 1.4(d)
¶1. (C) Post delivered the reftel message October 5 to Ministry for External Relations (MRE) Director for Disarmament and Sensitive Technologies Santiago Mourao. Mourao was well informed on the issue but was curious about the details of the proposal to provide fuel for the Teheran Research Reactor (TRR), including the levels of enrichment and the amount of Uranium Hexafloride to be exported to Russia for fuel manufacture. Mourao indicated that his office sought to keep informed on the situation and that Brazil would support the UN position, "even if Brazil disagrees."
¶2. (C) Mourao explained that while Brazil supported Iran,s right to peaceful use of nuclear technology, there was now a "deficiency in international confidence" over the Iranian nuclear program, which Iran should seek to address. Further, he believed that IAEA Director General El Baradei,s analysis that Iran had been bound by the reporting requirement in Modified Code 3.1 and should have reported to the IAEA about the Qom facility when it was being designed, not at this late date. He added that he expected Iranian President Ahmadinejad to visit Brasilia in November or December and that this would be an opportunity for President Lula to "once again urge the Iranians for a peaceful solution."
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BRASILIA 001186
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/18/2019
TAGS: KNNP PARM IAEA MNUC IR SY TRGY PREL BR
SUBJECT: BRAZILIAN VIEWS ON THE LATEST IAEA REPORTS ON IRAN AND SYRIA
Classified By: Charge d’Affaires Lisa Kubiske, Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). REF: A) STATE 91633, B) BRASILIA 1170
¶1. (C) SUMMARY. The Government of Brazil (GOB) is concerned about Iran’s and Syria’s nuclear activities and wants all parties to work with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to answer the outstanding questions. The GOB does not see the latest IAEA reports on these countries as closing those cases. Still, the GOB is not supportive of the Iran case being with the UN Security Council or the idea of the UNSC imposing additional sanctions. The GOB strongly objects to the use of unilateral military action in the case of Syria and is very concerned about the possibility of force being used against Iran. END SUMMARY.
¶2. (C) On September 11 Science Counselor and Science Officer met with Brazil’s Ministry of External Relations’ (MRE) Acting Director of the Division for Disarmament and Sensitive Technologies (DDS) Fabio Simao Alves to discuss the USG’s views – per REFTEL A – on the latest International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) reports on Iran and Syria. Alves was well informed about both matters, and he reiterated the Government of Brazil’s (GOB) cautious approach to both cases. IRAN
¶3. (C) Alves stressed that only through discussion can the dispute with Iran be resolved. The GOB is interested in learning the nature of the Iranian nuclear program and it does not rule out the possibility that the program has military aims. Thus, the GOB is supportive of the IAEA investigating the matter and getting answers. Alves stressed that the GOB sees the IAEA as the appropriate forum for dealing with Iran and not the UN Security Council (UNSC). The GOB wants the IAEA to become more active. Now that Brazil is going back on the UNSC it is particularly interested in the thinking of the P-5 plus Germany about Iran. He said that Brazil would not be supportive of the UNSC imposing additional sanctions, but it will fully comply with measures adopted by the UNSC.
¶4. (C) Brazil would like Iran to be more cooperative, he said. Then, he added that the GOB would like unnamed "other member states" to share more information about Iran with the IAEA. Alves appeared to be suggesting that there was a lack of sharing of information on Iran and that this was somehow impeding the IAEA’s efforts to understand the Iranian nuclear program.
¶5. (C) The GOB is "very concerned" about a possible military strike against Iran by another state, emphasized Alves. Brazil wants a peaceful solution to the Iran question.
¶6. (C) Alves said that the GOB could not publicly support a call for Iran to comply with an Additional Protocol. Since Brazil has not signed up to an Additional Protocol, it will not support calls that other countries comply with them.
¶7. (C) The GOB had heard reports, Alves noted, that Iranians were saying in Vienna that Iran should not be pressured so hard, but rather should be treated like Brazil. Brazil has an enrichment program and it is not being put under a microscope or being compelled to sign/comply with an Additional Protocol. Alves seemed unhappy about these reports and emphasized that the Iranian and Brazilian situations are quite different.
¶8. (C) The GOB at the IAEA would have a balanced statement about Iran, according to Alves. SYRIA
¶9. (C) The GOB was not planning to make a statement about Syria at the IAEA, Alves said. He declared that the GOB strongly condemned the use of force by a country against Syria; Brazil viewed this as impairing the work of the IAEA. Nonetheless, he acknowledged that there were outstanding questions about Syria’s activities and these should be cleared up. He added that the GOB has serious concerns about the Syrian program and did not consider it a case closed.
¶10. (C) As with the Iran case, Alves wanted unnamed "other member states" to share their imagery and other intelligence about Syria with the IAEA. He indicated that this unwillingness to share hindered the IAEA’s efforts to understand the Syrian activities.
COMMENT
¶1. (C) Brazil recognizes that there are serious questions outstanding about Iran’s and Syria’s nuclear activities and does not see these latest IAEA reports as closing those cases. The GOB, however, doesn’t seem willing to go much further than calling for everyone to cooperate more with the IAEA. It strongly opposes unilateral military action and doesn’t like the Iran case being with the UNSC. The GOB’s interest in the proposals and activities of the P-5 and Germany is more that they want to be well-informed than an interest in trying to contribute to crafting new measures to pressure Iran. We do see that the GOB’s objection to an Additional Protocol for Brazil is having an impact in the international arena, as the GOB is unwilling to call Iran on not complying with an Additional Protocol. END COMMENT.
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RUEHSO/AMCONSUL SAO PAULO 4565
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SECTION 01 OF 03 BRASILIA 001170
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/18/2019
TAGS: KNNP MNUC PARM IAEA IR PREL AORC BR
SUBJECT: BRAZIL ON IRAN: A SOFT VOICE IN THE CHORUS
REF: A. STATE 95073
¶B. STATE 94757
¶C. STATE 91633 D.
BRASILIA 1038 BRASILIA 00001170 001.2 OF 003
Classified By: Charge D’Affaires Lisa Kubiske for reasons 1.4 (b) and ( d).
¶1. (C) Summary. Brazilian MRE Undersecretary for Political Affairs Roberto Jaguaribe, recently returned from a diplomatic mission to Tehran, told Charge D’Affaires on September 16 that additional dialogue rather than sanctions will be most the most effective means of pressuring Iran to develop a responsible nuclear program. Jaguaribe emphasized that Iran’s nuclear program enjoys broad internal support and will not ultimately be stopped, so the goal should be to push Iran to follow international nuclear guidelines. He said that top Iranian officials draw a distinction between IAEA directives, which they are attempting to follow, and UNSC resolutions, which they view as unfair and in some cases illegitimate. Jaguaribe said he told the Iranians they are still not meeting their IAEA responsibilities, but he believes they are making progress. The Undersecretary did not discount the possibility of Brazil making a statement on Iran at UNGA but said any such remarks would be "balanced," referencing Iran’s lack of full compliance along with Brazil’s basic skepticism toward sanctions as a motivating tool. End summary.
Back from Tehran —————-
¶2. (C) Upon returning from his September 9-10 visit to Tehran, Undersecretary Jaguaribe took great care in his meeting with CDA to give not only the Brazilian but also the Iranian perspective to the points made in reftels A, B, and C. While in Iran, he met with Foreign Minister Manouchir Mottaki, National Security Council official Said Jalili, and Parliamentiary Foreign Policy Chair Aladdin Bourojerdi, among others. He issued joint press statements in Iran with each of these men to the effect that dialogue, not sanctions, was the key to solving the dispute at hand. In his meeting with CDA, Jaguaribe’s core message was not substantively different, but he went into greater detail on areas in which he had pressed Iran, areas where he saw Iran as non-compliant, and thoughts on how to influence them toward compliance. The Undersecretary’s basic view of post-election Iran had not changed. He characterized the nation a compromised democracy, but with a robust civil society that will make them ultimately open to substantive negotiation.
Brazil’s Message to Iran ————————
¶3. (C) Jaguaribe was careful to point out that, despite the friendly press conferences and the desire to schedule an Ahmadinejad visit to Brasilia in December, he raised specific criticisms with Iranian officials about their nuclear program. Most notably, he said that he told Mottaki and others that Iran was still not carrying out all its IAEA responsibilities, despite the late August decision to allow inspectors at Natanz and Arak. He also viewed the September 9 proposal to the P5 1 by the Iranian government, which was forwarded to him by the Iranians, as far too general to be an effective point of departure for further discussion. Jaguaribe said he had asked the Iranians to be more specific in their dialogue, and he told us that he thought the Iranians could be brought around to the point where they would make more specific proposals.
Brazilian Views on IAEA Report and Amcit Demarches ——————————————— —–
¶4. (C) During the meeting, Jaguaribe agreed with the U.S. interpretation of the main points of the IAEA report (ref C), i.e., that Iran has refused to suspend proliferation-senstive nuclear activities as required by the UNSC, has refused to implement the additional protocol, and has only partially cooperated with IAEA inspection demands. At times he reflected Iranian views without endorsing them, such as his reference to IAEA questions about past weaponization-related activities as "alleged reports." Jaguaribe had no immediate response to our demarche concerning Amcits detained in Iran (ref B) but sounded favorably disposed. During his meetings in Tehran, Iran gave Jaguaribe their own list of complaints/demands toward the U.S. These included complaints about "three U.S. Army personnel detained last month in Kurdistan," extradition of several Iranians, and disappearance of Iranians in Saudi Arabia and Istanbul.
BRASILIA 00001170 002.2 OF 003
Brazilian Engagement Strategy ——————————
¶5. (C) While trying to outline an overall engagement strategy toward Iran, Jaguaribe emphasized repeatedly that Iran will never give up its nuclear enrichment program, though it may be pressured into suspending it for periods of time. He argued that Iran’s nuclear program is broadly popular across all segments of society, including most government opponents and members of the exile community. Therefore, he continued, sanctions should not be used because the pain caused by them would push Iranians "with alternative views" toward supporting the current regime on a rare issue in which they are in general agreement. (He believed that oil import sanctions would be especially damaging to Iran’s economy — and especially effective in rallying popular Iranian support for its nuclear program.) Jaguaribe believed that the Iranian government was ultimately persuadable to follow international protocols, if pressured by both the international community and its civil society. He praised earlier U.S. efforts to initiate dialogue on the issue, and said that continued dialogue, even if not immediately successful, strengthens the hand of the more liberal elements of Iranian society.
Iranian, Brazilian Views on IAEA, UNSC ————————————–
¶6. (C) The Iranians pressed upon Jaguaribe their view that IAEA safeguards (and related directives) constitute broadly agreed upon international technical norms that the Iranians can follow, and will work to adhere to in the future. The Arak and Natanz inspections were cited as cases in point. Jaguaribe left convinced that the Iranians fully believe they are following IAEA guidelines — a point of view that the Undersecretary characterized to CDA as "delusional." Tehran drew a distinction between the IAEA and the UNSC, which they view as a body issuing political decisions that are "not legitimate." Jaguaribe did not endorse this view but said of the Iran-UNSC relationship, "there needs to be some movement on both sides." (Note: Brazil has long held the position that nuclear matters are best dealt with in the IAEA, and not in the UNSC. End note.) He added that a UN proposal related to nuclear disarmament would be helpful to resolve the impasse. He praised recent U.S. efforts in this regard and hoped more would be forthcoming.
Expanding the Chorus: Statement at UNGA —————————————
¶7. (C) Regarding the request outlined in ref A, Jaguaribe said there was a possibility that Brazil would consider addressing Iran’s nuclear program in its UNGA statement. He said that any such mention would be a balanced reference, mentioning both Iran’s need to meet IAEA and UNSC responsibilties while expressing skepticism toward UNSC sanctions as a motivating tool. He also said that Brazil would not shy away from saying that Iran’s September 9 response to the P5 1 needs to be more robust to be effective. (Comment: We believe it is very doubtful that Brazil will actually reference Iran in its UNGA statement. End comment.)
Comment ——-
¶8. (C) Having returned from Tehran less than a week earlier, Jaguaribe focused on the approach he believed would work best in resolving the disconnect between Iran’s confidence that it has given satisfactory answers about its nuclear program and the sense in the international community that the Iranians must be moved toward compliance. In general, Brazil can be expected to continue a cautious approach to the issue, keeping in mind its sometimes-competing desires to increase commercial relations with Iran, to develop Brazilian nuclear military technology for non-weaponmaking purposes without drawing international attention, and to gain a permanent UNSC seat — with the last goal being most important. In the short run, the easiest way for the GOB to massage the various interests is to call for increased multilateral dialogue and adherence to IAEA standards in order to forestall having to take a firm position in the UN on sanctions once Brazil assumes its temporary seat on the UNSC in January 2010. Brazil is aware, however, that Iranian compliance with IAEA safeguards would not necessarily equal Iran becoming a responsible nuclear power — as Jaguaribe mused during the meeting. In light of its traditional hesitance to take firm positions on contentious country-specific issues, and with visits by Ahmadinejad to Brazil and top Brazilian officials
BRASILIA 00001170 003.2 OF 003
to Iran being planned for the next few months, Brazil will have a soft voice in the chorus — but may prove useful nonetheless if senior GOB officials can be encouraged to whisper into Iran’s ear the idea that negotiation and compliance are its best option. End comment.
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INFO RUEHSO/AMCONSUL SAO PAULO 3035
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RUEHRG/AMCONSUL RECIFE 8677
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 BRASILIA 001477
SIPDIS
SENSITIVE
STATE PLEASE PASS TO IO/T – H. VON BEHREND, ISN/NESS – DICK STRATFORD, ISN/CPI – KEVIN MCGEEHAN, ISN/RA – RISA MONGIELLO; ENERGY PLEASE PASS TO NNSA – ADAM SCHEINMAN, RICHARD GOOREVICH, AND MELISSA KRUPA
E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: KNNP TRGY ENRG KSTC IAEA PARM BR
REF: A) STATE 112229,
B) STATE 114408,
C) STATE 89032,
D) BRASILIA 1289
¶1. (U) THIS CABLE IS SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED. PLEASE PROTECT ACCORDINGLY. NOT FOR INTERNET DISTRIBUTION.
¶2. (SBU) SUMMARY. Per November 10 meeting with the Ministry of External Relations (MRE) Division of Disarmament and Sensitive Technologies (DDS), the Government of Brazil (GOB) has not received an invitation to the Iran nuclear conference (REFTEL A). Further, it assures that it will comply with UN Security Council Resolutions regarding Iran and appreciated the information from the USG about freezing the assets of the Export Development Bank of Iran and three affiliated entities (REFTEL B). The MRE is supportive of the USG proposal (REFTELS C) for using IAEA safeguards for nuclear material returned to the United States from Brazil; however, the MRE is awaiting word from Brazil’s National Nuclear Energy Commission (CNEN) before formally responding to the U.S. diplomatic note (REFTEL D). Finally, on November 10, Post delivered a copy of the letter and proposed revision to Paragraph 6(a)(ii) of the Criteria Based Approach to Control Sensitive Nuclear Technologies in the NSG Part 1 Guidelines, from National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) Administrator Thomas D’Agostino, to Defense Minister Nelson Jobim and to MRE Under-Secretary for Bilateral Politics Ambassador Everton Vargas, with a copy for MRE/DDS. END SUMMARY.
NO INVITATION YET FROM IRAN FOR NUCLEAR CONFERENCE
¶3. (SBU) On October 28, 2008, Environment, Science and Technology (EST) Officer delivered REFTEL A non-paper on Iran’s upcoming nuclear conference on November 30, 2008 to Ministry of External Relations (MRE), Head of the Division of Disarmament and Sensitive Technologies (DDS), Minister Santiago Mourao, and to Third Secretary Fabio Simao Alves, who works in MRE/DDS. During a November 10 meeting between Simao Alves and EST Counselor and EST Officer, Simao Alves stated that the Government of Brazil (GOB) had not received an invitation from Iran and was not aware of the nuclear conference. MRE/DDS had looked into the matter, and neither the MRE’s Energy Department nor its Iran Desk had heard anything about the conference. In the case that it does receive an invitation, Simao Alves said the GOB realized such a conference would be a very sensitive political issue. The MRE would need to consider the matter carefully. Simao Alvas added that the GOB would welcome additional information on the conference should it become available. FREEZING ASSEST OF EDBI AND AFFILIATES – COMPLYING WITH UNSCRS
¶4. (SBU) Also at the November 10 meeting, EST Counselor and EST Officer raised with Simao Alves the matter of freezing the assets of the Export Development Bank of Iran (EDBI) and three affiliated entities. Post had earlier delivered to MRE/DDS REFTEL B, which notified the GOB that pursuant to UN Security Council Resolutions (UNSCRs) 1737, 1747 and 1803, and Executive Order 13382, the USG was freezing the assets of EDBI and these affiliates. Simao Alves appreciated the information and stressed that the GOB was committed to upholding the UNSCRs regarding Iran. He said they were not aware of EDBI or any of the affiliated entities being present in Brazil. He reassured that the GOB was doing its utmost to internalize and comply with the UNSCRs regarding Iran.
SAFEGUARDS FOR NUCLEAR MATERIAL CONTAINED IN IRRADIATED RESEARCH REACTOR FUEL RETURNED BY BRAZIL
¶5. (SBU) During the November 10 meeting, ESTOFFs followed up on REFTEL C with respect to arrangements that proposed to apply International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards to irradiated research reactor fuel of U.S. origin to be returned from Brazil to the U.S. Department of Energy Savannah River Facility for disposition. On September 22, Post had delivered this proposal per Diplomatic Note number 387 (see REFTEL D). Simao Alves indicated that the MRE supported this proposed application of safeguards. However, the MRE had to finish its consultations with the Brazil’s National Nuclear Energy Commission (CNEN) to query about an official response. Simao Alves said that MRE was awaiting the formal response from CNEN. MRE would send an official response once it became available.
PROPOSED LANGUAGE FOR NUCLEAR SUPPLIERS GROUP CRITERIA-BASED APPROACH TO TRANSFER OF ENRICHMENT AND REPROCESSING TECHNOLOGY
¶6. (SBU) On November 10, Post delivered a hard copy of the letter BRASILIA 00001477 002 OF 002 and proposed revision to Paragraph 6(a)(ii) of the Criteria Based Approach to Control Sensitive Nuclear Technologies in the NSG Part 1 Guidelines, from National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) Administrator Thomas D’Agostino, to Defense Minister Nelson Jobim and to MRE Under-Secretary for Bilateral Politics Ambassador Everton Vargas, with a copy for MRE/DDS.
SOBEL
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BRASILIA 003124
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/29/2015
TAGS: KNNP PARM PREL AORC BR IR IAEA
REF: STATE 213341
Classified By: PolCouns Dennis Hearne, 1.4 (B) & (D)
¶1. (C) Embassy presented reftel demarche November 28 to Santiago Mourao, director of the Foreign Ministry’s Disarmament and Sensitive Technologies Division. Mourao said the GOB had maintained frequent contact with the EU3 on the issue and had also had two recent discussions of the issue with the Iranians.
¶2. (C) Mourao said that the Iranian Deputy Foreign Minister, who visited Brazil in October, had thanked the Brazilians for their "support", referring to Brazil’s abstention on the IAEA resolution concerning the Iranian nuclear program. The Brazilians told him that the GOB vote in the IAEA BOG should not be interpreted as an endorsement of Iranian actions, but rather as a judgment that referral to the UNSC is not the most appropriate tactical course of action. The GOB stressed that, while all countries have the right to develop nuclear energy, that right is conditioned on full compliance with international commitments such as the NPT and IAEA safeguards agreements. In the case of Iran, Brazil sees a necessity to make particular efforts to repair the lack of confidence on the part of the international community regarding Iran’s program. The GOB told the Minister that it expects Iran to make particular efforts to cooperate with the IAEA in a more proactive and transparent manner.
¶3. (C) Mourao said he believes Iran is now being more forthcoming, but the pending issues have yet to be resolved. The GOB has told the GOI that it needs to suspend all enrichment activities and abide by the commitments it made concerning its program. Iran should restart negotiations with the EU3. Mourao added that Brazil supported the Russian initiative to transfer Iranian enrichment capabilities from Iran to Russia. This could be a useful confidence-building measure, even if it is not an ideal long-term solution.
¶4. (C) The second discussion with Iran came after the new Iranian president made a speech in Tehran saying Iran was being treated in a discriminatory fashion when compared to the cases of South Korea and Brazil. The Foreign Ministry called in the Iranian Ambassador and told him such comments were not proper. The Iranian Ambassador blamed the problem on a translation error.
¶5. (C) Mourao noted that the regular Undersecretary-level talks that Brazil holds with Iran have been postponed for "technical reasons." The real reason for the postponement is Brazilian displeasure with the Iranian president’s public statements concerning Israel.
LINEHAN
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